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Summary:
Work is under way on a forecasting method that incorporates explicit
representations of the steps in the oil supply process: exploration,
reservoir development, and production. The discovery history of a region
and other geological data are inputs to a statistical analysis of the
exploratory process. The resulting estimate of the size distribution of
new reservoirs is combined with an evaluation of reservoir economics —
taking account of engineering cost, oil price, and taxes. The model produces
a forecast of additions to the productive reserve base and oil supply. Progress
to date is demonstrated in an application to the North Sea.
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FORECASTING PETROLEUM DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT
AND PRODUCTION
Various methods have been applied by economists to forecast the
future supply of petroleum. Current researchers in this area benefit
from a substantial literature that has developed over the past fifteen
years, since the publication of Fisher's pioneering work [9]. The
range, of techniques developed in this literature is quite broad. There
are conventional econometric studies of petroleum supply, which essen-
tially extrapolate historical trends into the future, conditional on
certain market parameters [7, 8 3 9, 12, 13]. There is a separate col-
lection of studies whose main focus is on engineering-based cost esti-
mates pertaining to the various activities and investments involved in
the supply process, the objective generally being to provide a minimum
cost estimate at which additional quantities of reserves and production
could be made available [14, 15]. Also, there is a rather large set of
supply forecasts, most commonly made by the oil companies themselves,
which incorporate a relatively detailed knowledge of specific producing
fields and prospective new areas.
Each method has particular advantages and all have contributed to
our knowledge of future oil supplies. Nevertheless, many of the studies
have in common two limitations which seriously impinge on their fore-
casting performance and usefulness for policy discussions of the current
energy situation. Perhaps the most basic limitation is that few of the
forecasting methods are equipped to deal with the phenomenon of resource
depletion in a way that consistently reflects underlying geological
realities. This aspect of the forecasting problem is of undoubted
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significance; indeed it is what gives the task of oil supply forecasting
its main distinction, and we are rather uncomfortable with any study
which deals with it only superficially or in an ad hoc manner.
A second limitation involves the way in which economic incentives
for oil production are represented in the analyses. All econometric
studies naturally consider the well-head price of oil to be a key deter-
minant of supply. But what really matters is the net price received by
producers after allowing for tax payments which have typically varied
significantly over the period for which the econometric models have been
estimated. Consequently, the effective level of economic incentives for
oil production has varied in a way that is difficult to reconstruct on
the basis of available economic time-series data. In any event, if the
influence of tax provisions and the cost structure is not represented
explicitly in the model, it becomes difficult to apply the model, as
the policy-maker would like, to trace out the implications of future
changes in these factors.
The studies based on engineering cost estimates have generally in-
cluded an explicit representation of the economic incentive to produce
oil, perhaps more so than the econometric approach. But the preoccupa-
tion of such studies with the so-called average or "representative" oil
field makes it difficult for the economist to then infer the required
level of incentives to elicit production from the marginal sources, which
are of most interest [15]. Presumably, the oil companies have implicit
in their forecasts an estimate of the contribution from marginal fields,
but company forecasts are too often reported without reference to the
underlying economic assumptions or scenarios to be of much use to the
ITJ <•
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policy-maker who would use the estimates to evaluate the effects of al-
ternative policy actions.
The Disaggregated Process Model
In response to these two limitations of existing forecasting tech-
niques, work was begun by a group (then working at the MIT Energy Labor-
atory) to develop an alternative methodology better equipped to deal
with the issues of resource depletion and economic incentives. Some of
the fruits of this research are embodied in what is called a "disaggre-
gated process model" of petroleum supply, which has been described in
a recent paper by Eckbo, Jacoby, and Smith [5]. The basic elements of
this model will be reviewed below.
The term "disaggregated" means simply that a forecast of aggregate
oil supply from some producing area is built up from individual fore-
casts pertaining to specific reservoirs within that area. The disaggre-
gation achieves a "plant-level" unit of observation, and is an important
element of the analysis due to the heterogeneous nature of petroleum
deposits. Not only are the scale economies of producing from reservoirs
of differing size significant, but also the effect of most local and
national tax regimes depends on the characteristics of the individual
reservoirs which contribute to supply. Moreover, as reserves are ex-
hausted, the composition of the stock of reservoirs changes, with the
result that tax incidence and production costs may change as depletion
proceeds. Without some means to deal with the composition of producing
reservoirs it is difficult to identify and interpret the influence of
these factors.
I/:
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We call the forecasting method a "process model" because separate
components of the supply mechanism are distinguished (e.g., exploration,
development, and production) and modelled after the actual physical ac-
tivities involved. The general structure of the model is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The sequence of activities begins in the upper left corner of the
diagram (Box 1), where the level of exploratory drilling is determined.
Drilling is undertaken with the expectation of discovering some volume
of new reserves, the quantity and composition being dependent on the
geological potential of the area in question (Box 2) . The supply poten-
tial of newly discovered reservoirs depends on the prevailing level of
economic incentives (prices, costs, and taxes), and the characteristics
of the reservoirs themselves (Box 3) . Under prevailing economic condi-
tions some reservoirs will be economic to develop and enter the produc-
tion stage (Box 4). Subeconomic reservoirs revert to an inventory of
known reserves that may enter into production at a later time if economic
conditions improve (Box 5) . Finally, production from new reservoirs is
complemented by continuing production from reservoirs that are known to
exist at the time the forecast is made (Box 6) . Of course, there are
interactions among the separate stages in this process. For example,
the level of exploratory effort that initiates the sequence is generally
sensitive to the economic characteristics of the potential discoveries
that may result.
The treatment of resource depletion and economic incentives enters
this framework at several points, as discussed below.
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Resource Depletion
Resource depletion operates at two levels in the model. First, the
existing stock of reservoirs is depleted as production from known reser-
voirs proceeds. The reserves of any reservoir may ultimately be ex-
hausted, and in this manner the reservoir is eventually withdrawn from
production. Secondly, the store of potential reservoirs from which the
reserve base is renewed via exploration is depleted as the discovery
process continues. The phenomenon of reservoir discovery is portrayed
in the model as a stochastic process which proceeds in accordance with
specified physical laws consistent with underlying geological facts.
This process may be thought of as a "stochastic production function"
which governs the relationship between exploratory effort and discovery
success. The relationship is stochastic in that it allows that a given
amount of effort may or may not result in success, or perhaps in suc-
cesses of varying magnitude.
Two statistical postulates about the exploratory process constitute
the stochastic discovery model:
(1) The discovery of reservoirs in the area of a petroleum play* can be
modelled statistically as sampling without replacement. This means
simply that once a reservoir has been indentif led, it is then re-
moved from the remaining population of potential new discoveries.
(2) The discovery of a particular reservoir from among the remaining pop-
ulation is random, with probability of discovery being proportional
*A "play" is defined as a group of similar geological configurations
generated by a series of common geological events, forming a population
of prospects that is conceived or proven to contain hydrocarbons.
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to reservoir size. The concept of an underlying reservoir size
distribution is implicit here. The postulate has the effect of a
discovery law which generates the "largest-first" phenomenon so
familiar to explorationists.
These two postulates and their usefulness to us have grown out of the
research of Kaufman and his associates [1, 10, 11]. We follow their work
closely in the application discussed below.
The postulates enable one to formulate the probability of observ-
ing any particular sequence of discoveries, conditional on knowledge of
the parameters of the underlying size distribution of reservoirs (which
Kaufman, et. al. take to be lognormal) . Conversely, conditional on an
observed discovery sequence, it is possible to estimate the parameters
of the underlying size distribution by the method of maximum likelihood.
Moreover, having obtained these estimates, it is possible to derive
predictive probability distributions which characterize the size of each
succeeding discovery in the play. Consequently, it is possible to gen-
erate a sequence of expected discovery sizes, and their variances, upon
which a forecast of future production can be based. The details of
this procedure have been described elsewhere [1, 51.
In a previous paper [5], we have used this predictive discovery
sequence estimated for the North Sea petroleum province to construct
estimates of future supplies. Figure 2, below, illustrates schematically
the way in which the predictive distributions evolve as exploration pro-
ceeds. Figure 3 shows the sequence of expected discovery sizes computed
from these distributions, as compared to the historical sequence of 60
discoveries upon which the estimation was based. The phenomenon of
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discovery decline is clearly evident, reflecting the influence of the
two postulates.
Economic Incentives
The decision to produce from an existing reservoir is influenced
by the sequence of discounted cash flows that would result, net of all
operating and investment costs, and tax and royalty payments. We have
constructed a model of reservoir development which computes the net
present value of developing a reservoir of specified size. Included in
this model is a fairly detailed representation of development and op-
erating cost functions, estimated on the basis of North Sea reservoir-
specific data [5]. In addition, the tax regimes of the British and
Norwegian sectors are included in great detail, encompassing payments
for accrued royalties, corporate tax, petroleum revenue tax, special
tax, withholding tax, capital tax; and special deduction and deprecia-
tion rules, oil production allowances, and minimum liability provisions.*
The reservoir model is used to identify the minimum reservoir size
that assures viable economic development, and thus to determine the
economic margin which governs the entry of reservoirs into the produc-
tion stage. Of course this margin is related to the price and tax
*The tax systems of the Norwegian and British sectors of the North
Sea are differentiated by several features which affect specific reser-
voirs in different ways. The net influence of the two tax regimes on
the economic incentive for production, however, is thought to be quite
similar [2, 5], The forecasts presented below have been generated by
applying the Norwegian tax regime to all reservoirs in the North Sea.
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parameters assumed. The behavior of marginal reservoir size as it is
influenced by the well-head price of oil is illustrated in Figure 4.*
North Sea Forecast
The general method of application to the North Sea petroleum pro-
vince can now be outlined. First, a level of exploratory drilling is
hypothesized. In the earlier paper this level was determined exogenously
in accordance with the announced drilling plans of the operators in the
area (44 exploratory wells per year), and extrapolated into the future.
One justification for doing this is the apparent rigidity of the an-
nounced drilling program; the rigidity being enforced partly by the long
lead times and budgeting cycles involved in planning an exploration cam-
paign, and partly by the constraint on more rapid activity imposed im-
plicitly by the pace of government licensing schedules. Using the pre-
dictive discovery sequence of Figure 3, in conjunction with an allowance
for dry hole risk,** the expected number and respective sizes of ensuing
discoveries is predicted for each year in the forecast period.
The economic viability and ultimate disposition of each expected
discovery is determined using the reservoir model. If viable, the
reservoir enters into the development and production stage, otherwise it
*The exact form of this relationship differs from that reported in
Eckbo, Jacoby, and Smith [5] due to the reestimation of the underlying
cost function based on a new set of data that has recently become avail-
able. These estimates are discussed in more detail in a memorandum
available from the authors.
**Dry hold risk is set at 75%, approximately the historical figure
for North Sea exploration.
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is relegated to an inventory of submarginal reservoirs to await more
favorable conditions. Annual production from all new reservoirs is then
added to a forecast of production from existing fields to arrive at an
overall forecast of production from the North Sea.* The forecast is
conditional on the hypothesized level of exploration effort, and price
and tax parameters; so one can observe the impact on future oil supplies
as these factors are manipulated. The actual forecast of North Sea
supplies generated in this fashion will be presented below.
Endogenous Exploration
A major limitation of the previous application of the model is that
the pace of exploration is not permitted to respond to economic incentives,
although such an interaction is clearly desirable and possible within the
framework outlined in Figure 1. In this section we report on some new
research which bridges this gap.
The forecast already described is conditioned by an exogenous speci-
fication regarding the rate of exploratory drilling. However, it is
possible for the forecaster to conduct a search over the range of feasible
drilling rates and identify the specific rate which leads to a maximum
net present value of the ultimate production that is expected to result.
Presumably, this is the criterion by which industry formulates its
*Production from existing fields is forecast on the basis of an-
nounced plans, and is insensitive to changes in the price level. Although
the recovery factor for these reservoirs might be expected to respond to
changes in price, at the present cost level methods of pressure mainten-
ance are nearly universal, while the next stage in methods for enhanced
recovery is significantly more expensive, and unlikely to see widespread
use at prices in the range $S-$18 ($1976).
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drilling plans, and it is the link we use to relate the pace of explora-
tion to prevailing economic incentives. By presenting the one forecast
which embodies the drilling program associated with maximum net present
value, the rate of drilling is made endogenous to the forecasting pro-
cedure.*
A Myopic Drilling Model
The search for a value-maximizing drilling program may be carried
out subject to a number of behavioral constraints which reflect the way
in which the industry makes drilling decisions. A strong assumption
would be that industry makes "near-sighted" drilling decisions on an
annual basis; that is, drilling would be carried out each year at the
level which maximizes the expected net present value of that year's ex-
ploration campaign considered in isolation. In this formulation the
companies would be assumed to look ahead and foresee the economic rewards
ultimately accruing to discoveries resulting from present exploration;
but they would not take into account the diminished potential for future
discoveries which this entails. Of course, the companies might have
reason to regret this type of myopic decision-making if, for example,
prices subsequently rose when no more oil was available for market.
In spite of this limitation of the myopic formulation, we have
carried out the analysis under this assumption; mainly to provide a
benchmark, but also because the necessary computations and programming
*In practice the examination of alternative drilling rates and
selection of the optimum is done internally by computer, so the search
procedure is not cumbersome.

-15-
difficulties are greatly simplified in this case. The resulting forecast
will admittedly be unsatisfactory if the ignored element of "user cost"
(foregone profits due to premature development) turns out to play a sig-
nificant role in the North Sea. In defense of our simplification how-
ever, it should be said that there is fairly strong evidence, to be dis-
cussed later, which suggests that user cost does not dominate in North
Sea drilling decisions, and hence that the myopic formulation can be
expecced to give reasonable results.
One determinant of the rate of drilling in the North Sea is the
availability of rigs. The short run availability of rigs is determined
by the cost at which existing rigs can be bid away from other parts of
the world and brought into service in the North Sea. The long run avail-
ability of rigs is determined by the production costs at which existing
capacity can be expanded over the long term. The short run constraint
on rig capacity is represented in our model by a cost-of-adjustment factor
which imposes additional costs whenever annual drilling activity in the
North Sea is expanded beyond its previous maximum. This cost function
takes the simple constant elasticity form, such that short-term drilling
costs are increased by 1/2% above the long run level during any year when
drilling activity is extended by 1% above the maximum historical rate;
thus, the short-run elasticity of drilling costs beyond the point of full
capacity is assumed to be O.5.*
*This elasticity is a parameter that can be manipulated by the
researcher, but we do not experiment with it further in the present
paper.
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Four forecasts have been constructed, corresponding to alternative
assumptions regarding future prices and taxes. A "baseline" scenario
is first considered, in which the well-head price of oil remains constant
at $12 per barrel ($1976) and the current tax regime remains in effect.
This is compared to the forecast that obtains at the $12 price if the
tax regime were abolished altogether (the "no-tax" scenario) . The base-
line forecast is also compared to the case where the real price of oil
is assumed to rise above $12 at the constant rate of 2% per year (the
"rising price" scenario). Finally, we present a forecast predicated
on the baseline economic conditions, but with a government constraint
on the pace of development which limits exploratory drilling to 44 wells
per year (the "constrained" scenario treated in the previous paper [5]).
The respective forecasts of annual drilling effort and exploratory
success are presented in Table 1, below. Three conclusions of general
interest emerge from the table. First, the "constrained" drilling pro-
gram of 44 wells per year, which was hypothesized in the previous paper
on the basis of the industry's announced drilling plans, coincides with
the value-maximizing program obtained under the assumptions of the myopic
model (cf., columns 1 and 2). Consequently, the forecast obtained earlier
is consistent with the present formulation of the drilling problem.
Second, the current tax regime appears to impose a significant distortion
of North Sea development (cf., columns 2 and 3). Industry's activity is
affected in two ways: The pace of development is slowed considerably due
to taxes; and ultimate resource recovery from the area is diminished (the
cumulative number of wells declines by 6.8%, while cumulative additions
to reserves declines by 4.2%). The implication here is that in spite of
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the incentives which encourage development of marginal fields (e.g.,
sliding scale royalties) , the current tax system is far from a position
of neutrality.* Finally, we see from the table that the supply of North
Sea oil is highly sensitive to fluctuations in the well-head price
(cf., columns 2 and 4). A sustained 2% increase in price results in a
48% increase in total drilling activity over the 10 year period and a
25% increase in expected additions to the reserve base.**
The effect of price and tax changes on ultimate production takes
longer to become visible because of the lags which intervene between the
discovery, development, and production stages. The effect of these lags
is seen in Table 2, which translates the reserve additions of Table 1
into annual production flows. One pattern is common to all four scenarios:
after the initial four-year lead time, production gradually rises to a
peak and thereafter declines continuously as the producing reservoirs
are depleted, with no additional discoveries to take up the slack. The
three specific comments regarding Table 1 also apply to Table 2. The
"constrained" production forecast coincides with the results of the "base-
line" value-maximizing drilling program. Production flows are consider-
ably slowed by the influence of the tax regime, and ultimate recovery
is diminished. The rising well-head price of oil effects a sustained
increase in the level of production.
*A more detailed discussion of the distortions created by the North
Sea tax regimes may be found in a paper by Eckbo [2],
**The difference between the price responsiveness of drilling versus
discovery is due to the fact that the finding rate (barrels/well) de-
creases as the resource potential is exhausted.
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TABLE 2
Production Forecast - New Discoveries
Production - million barrels/dry
Year constrained baseline no tax rising price
76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
80 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.16
81 0.57 0.57 0.93 0.57
82 1.03 1.03 1.66 1.03
83 1.43 1.43 2.19 1.43
84 1.78 1.78 2.46 1.78
85 2.09 2.09 2.52 2.09
86 2.31 2.31 2.52 2.36
87 2.40 2.40 2.52 2.59
88 2.30 2.30 2.34 2.69
89 2.10 2.10 2.01 2.64
90 1.88 1.88 1.66 2.48
91 1.62 1.62 1.32 2.26
92 1.35 1.35 1.04 2.01
93 1.11 1.11 0.87 1.80
94 0.78 0.78 0.52 1.46
95 0.53 0.53 0.26 1.16
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One further point emerges from the forecasts, that is the flexi-
bility of the current forecasting approach and its ability to monitor
the influence of well-defined policy actions directed at the petroleum
sector.
A Two-Period Drilling Model
As noted above, a significant limitation of the myopic approach is
that no account is taken of the industry's incentive to schedule develop-
ment to achieve an optimal intertemporal management of their primary
capital asset, oil reserves. Thus far, we have imagined reservoir de-
velopment to proceed today as if there were no opportunity to postpone
it for tomorrow. Certainly, if costs and/or prices were expected to
deviate significantly in the future, this aspect of the problem would
have to be considered.
To gain some insight in this matter, the myopic drilling model has
been extended to incorporate the influence of future profitability on
current development decisions. This extension is achieved by the use
of a two-period optimizing criterion, wherein the current and succeeding
years' drilling plans are determined simultaneously to maximize the
combined net present value of both years' operations. Consequently, if
a sufficient price, jump or cost reduction were anticipated in the en-
suing year, it would pay to postpone resource development.
A set of North Sea forecasts, similar to those of Table 1, has been
constructed using the two-period optimizing criterion. Each forecast
consists of a sequence of overlapping two-period plans. A plan is
initially made for the first two years' development. The first year's

-21-
plan is immediately carried out; the plan for the following year may
or may not be carried out, because when the time arrives a new two-year
plan will be formulated and displace the previous one. By examining
the sequential behavior that emerges from this model, it is possible to
learn what level of price and cost fluctuations would be required to
induce deviations from myopic plans as economic changes appear on the
horizon.
Before discussing the results of this exercise, it is necessary to
describe one added simplification imposed on the two-period drilling
model. To simplify the computation, a simplified characterization of
the North Sea tax regime has been used, in which the only component is
a 10% production royalty. This model of government receipts is not as
realistic as it might be; however the abstraction is not expected to
significantly influence the basic pattern of the industry's inter-
temporal response to changing prices and development costs.*
Three forecasts have been generated using the two-period drilling
model, corresponding to alternative scenarios regarding prices and costs.
First a baseline scenario is considered, in which the real well-head
price of oil remains constant at $12 per barrel ($1976), and development
and operating costs remain constant at their 1976 levels. Then we ex-
amine the impact of a sudden jump in price from $12 to $15 occurring in
the third year of the forecast period. Finally, we examine the impact
*It is possible to carry out the analysis under a more complete
description of the North Sea tax regime, but due to time limitations
this has not been completed.
:if.i.
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of a similar 20% decrease in costs, perhaps caused by the eventual intro-
duction of sub-sea completion systems. The resulting forecasts of drilling
activity are presented in Table 3.
Because of the different representation of the tax regime we cannot
compare this set of forecasts directly with those presented earlier.
However one can inspect the results to learn to what extent myopic plans
are revised in response to foreseen changes in the economic parameters.
For example, consider the case of a price-jump. As of 1976 operators
plan to drill 60 exploratory wells both in 1976 and 1977, in accordance
with an expected price of $12 in both years. In 1977, however, operators
see that the price will subsequently jump to $15, and they reconsider
the extent of current drilling in light of this factor. Conceivably,
they might slow the pace in 1977 to await the more favorable circum-
stances in 1978. In fact, they do not postpone development, but com-
plete the 60 wells as planned (indicated by the arrow) , and contemplate
an additional 64 wells in 1978. The hypothesized price jump of 25% is
apparently not a sufficient inducement to cause a revision in their
short run plans, because the additional revenues that would accrue in
the later year (discounted at 12%) would be insufficient to compensate
them for the loss of current revenues.
A similar conclusion emerges from the cost-reduction analysis.
Foreseeing a 20% cost reduction is not a sufficient incentive to post-
pone development; this is evident from the comparison of 1977 plans
with actual drilling.
There are two factors in the present analysis which contribute
to this effect. First, anticipated profit margins in the North Sea are
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TABLE 3
Forecast Drilling Activity - Two Period Model
Baseline Price--Jump Cost-Reduction
Year
current ensuing
drilling plan
current
drilling
ensuing
plan
current ensuing
drilling plan
76 60 ^,60 60 ^ 60 60 60
77 60 «" 60 60k^ 64 60k^ 60
78 60 24 60 60 60 60
79 20 60 52 60 4
80 48 4
81 4 4
82
..
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relatively large, so that any delay In revenues constitutes a significant
deduction from net present value. In addition, the influence of the cost
of adjustment function inhibits large build-ups or sudden transfers of
drilling capacity from one period to another. A third factor, which is
left out of the analysis, would be expected to contribute further to the
reluctance to concentrate development in future periods; that is the
investment depreciation allowances and special capital write-offs that
are permitted under the North Sea tax regimes. These provisions make
it desirable to schedule development in the present, if for no other
reason, to provide deductions from income to be earned in the future.
Consequently, any change in economic incentives which promises to en-
hance net revenues in the future simultaneously gives rise to an ad-
ditional incentive to accumulate a depreciable capital stock in the
present.
Our interpretation of the results of the two-period analysis is
that current costs, prices, and tax provisions in the North Sea combine to
minimize the significance of user cost. Rather dramatic fluctuations in
future prices and costs would seem to be required before the industry
could gain much from a truly dynamic, long-range formulation of the drill-
ing problem. Consequently, the forecasts predicated on myopic behavior
may not be such bad approximations to the true state of affairs. But, of
course, there is no assurance that this conclusion would apply to other
.
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areas of the world, or under different economic circumstances even in
the North Sea.*
Concluding Remarks
The many factors which influence the supply of petroleum reflect
the complexity of the underlying activities which lead to ultimate pro-
duction of the resource. We hope the disaggregated process approach
provides a general conceptual framework which identifies these factors,
but we cannot pretend to have dealt with all of the important issues
in the work completed to date. In the previous paper [5] analysis was
focused on the potential to augment the current resource base through
exploration, and the impact of extending the economic margin to encom-
pass the many small reservoirs which are generated by the discovery
process but held in abeyance until favorable economic incentives warrant
their development. In the present paper we have also considered the
tempo (measured in terms of wells drilled and annual reserve additions)
at which this process is likely to proceed; assuming throughout that
the decisions which govern the speed of exploitation are made in accor-
dance with the well-defined economic principles of profit and loss.
At least two apsects of the supply process deserve more attention
than they are given here. The first concerns the speed with which oil
*The significance of user cost in the North Sea basin has been ex-
plored further by Eckbo and Hnyilicza [4], who formulate the choice of
a drilling program as an optimal control problem. That approach is a
direct generalization of the two-period model discussed above. While
their results are generally consistent with the conclusions of the
current paper, it is difficult to compare the two sets of results in
more detail due to the imposition of several additional constraints
that were required to render the control problem tractable.
.•-
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is extracted from individual reservoirs. We have used actual reservoir
development plans in the North Sea as a guide in specifying reasonable
time-profiles for production. However, what is desired is an extension
of the reservoir model that would make the speed of extraction endogenous
to the forecasting system. As described here, fluctuations in the speed
of extraction would affect the timing of deliveries rather than the total
amount of resource ultimately recovered. But the recovery factor (i.e.,
the fraction of oil ultimately withdrawn) is a second variable that may
respond to economic incentives, and an idealized model of reservoir
development would also account for this factor. One agenda for research
in this area, and its relation to the present work, has been described
elsewhere [3].
Perhaps the most serious limitation of the current form of the dis-
aggregated process model is that it abstracts almost entirely from the
risks inherent in petroleum exploration. The assumed criterion governing
development plans is that of maximizing the value of expected discoveries
and production. Of course, substantial fluctuations do occur around the
average success ratio and mean discovery size, and these may be expected
to slow the pace of development and eliminate certain petroleum prospects
from the category of economic viability. Industry's response to these
uncertainties is conditioned not only by the inherent geological risks,
but also by the licensing provisions decreed by governments. Conversely,
the policies adopted by governments, and their consequences, are shaped
by the ability of the industry and the governments to assume financial
risks. Some analysis of the magnitude of these risks (geological and
financial) is possible within the present framework [6], but the
-
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associated difficulties are not small and further discussion goes rather
quickly beyond the scope of the present paper.
On the bright side there remain several considerations which recom-
mend the disaggregated process model as a useful tool for studying the
future supply of oil. A major virtue of the technique is that the in-
fluences of resource depletion and economic incentives are represented
explicitly in the analysis. Consequently, it is possible to identify
those aspects of the supply mechanism which are influential in obtain-
ing a specific set of results. In addition, the technique satisfies
the most basic requirement of all forecasting procedures; that it can
be practicably applied to petroleum provinces in the real world that
may be of strategic importance to policymakers. The North Sea illus-
tration is intended to be one demonstration of the feasibility of this
particular course of research.
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